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ABSTRACT
This article investigates how Max Weber’s theory of value 
conflict is connected to his realist understanding of politics 
and how he conceives the relation of politics and ethics. This 
investigation also covers Weber’s views on the argumenta-
tive limits of the social sciences and ethics. The center of 
Weber’s philosophy of science is constituted by his method-
ological thoughts on “ethical neutrality” (Wertfreiheit) of the 
social sciences. The first thesis of this paper contends that 
Weber’s theory of a clash of irreconcilable values and ideals 
goes back to Nietzsche. According to the second thesis of the 
article, the general claim of Weber’s philosophy of science 
is that there is no possibility of an ultimate rational, phil-
osophical, or scientific grounding of values and normative 
theories. Weber’s endorsement of an ethics of responsibility 
in the field of politics led to the criticism that he contradicts 
his postulate of the “ethical neutrality” (Wertfreiheit) of the 
scientist. The third thesis of the paper claims that Weber’s 
arguments for a political ethics of responsibility are compat-
ible with his methodological postulate.
Keywords: Max Weber, Politics, Rationality, Ethics, Clash of 
Values, Political Realism, Ethical Neutrality.
Dîvân D İ S İ P L İ N L ERARAS I
ÇALIŞMALAR DERGİSİ
Cilt 24 say› 47 (2019/2): 111-140
DOI: 10.20519/divan.670011
Dîvân
2019 / 2
112
Manuel Knoll
MAX WEBER’S UNDERSTANDING OF POLITICS AND THE 
STRUGGLE OF OPPOSING VALUES
About 100 years ago, during the summer of 1919, Max Weber 
published a talk he had given in Munich during the preceding rev-
olutionary winter that followed the end of World War I.1 The talk 
was titled “Politik als Beruf.” To render the two meanings of the 
German “Beruf,” his title was translated as “The Profession and 
Vocation of Politics.” 2 Weber is maybe best known as one of the 
founders of sociology and for his (economic) sociology of religion. 
However, he was also philosopher, historian, political economist, 
and jurist. And his talk on politics in Munich was not an “occa-
sional job,” but was based on a considerable number of political 
writings, which he mostly penned during World War I.3
Max Weber’s understanding of politics follows the realist tradi-
tion that goes back to Thucydides and some of the Greek sophists.4 
One feature of this tradition, to which also Niccolò Machiavelli 
belongs, is a sober and realistic view of political reality, human 
1 In 1917, Weber was an invited speaker in a lecture series, organized by a 
student association called “Münchner Freistudentischer Bund.” Before his 
talk on politics, he had given in the same series a talk on “The Profession 
and Vocation of Science” (Wissenschaft als Beruf). 
2 Max Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” Weber. Political 
Writings, ed. Peter Lassmann and Ronald Speirs (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), 309-69. In the previous rendering by H. H. Gerth 
and C. Wright Mills, this title was translated as “Politics as a Vocation.” 
Similarly, Gerth and Mills translated Weber’s earlier talk as “Science as a 
Vocation”; both in From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology. Trans. and ed. 
H. H. Gerth, and C. Wright Mills (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 
77–156. Both traditional renderings do not do justice to the fact that the 
German “Beruf” means both “vocation” and “profession.” 
3 Most of these writing are translated into English and published in the 400 
page volume Weber. Political Writings. The German edition of his political 
writings contains 600 pages; Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, 
ed. Johannes Winckelmann (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr / Siebeck, 1988). For 
the historical background of Weber’s talk see Kari Palonen, Eine Lobrede 
für Politik. Ein Kommentar zu Max Webers “Politik als Beruf” (Opladen: 
Leske and Buderich, 2002), 112.
4 In the volume Roots of Realism, which is devoted to different aspects of re-
alism in international politics, three articles are devoted to Thucydides and 
one to the sophists; The Roots of Realism, ed. Benjamin Frankel (London: 
Routledge, 1996).
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being, and its moral defects.5 It rejects “ideal theory” and consid-
ers only pure factuality. According to political realism, power is 
the central category both in politics and for an understanding of 
the “political.”6 For Weber, politics means “striving for a share of 
power or for influence on the distribution of power, whether it be 
between states or between the groups of people contained within 
a single state.”7 He states that “all politics is essentially struggle.”8 
According to Weber, the political struggle is part of a bigger and 
more fundamental fight. This is the constant struggle of opposing 
values and ideals. As early as 1904, Weber states that one “must 
recognize” that “the highest ideals, which move us most forcefully, 
are always effective only in the struggle with other ideals which are 
just as sacred to others as ours are to us.”9 In 1917, he puts his the-
ory of value conflict even more dramatically, “It is really a question 
not only of alternatives between values but of an irreconcilable 
death-struggle, like that between ‘God’ and the ‘Devil’. Between 
these, neither relativization nor compromise is possible. At least 
not in the t r u e  sense [dem S i n n  nach nicht].”10 One main aim of 
5 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 360. According to a con-
temporary political science textbook, Machiavelli and Weber are the main 
representatives of a realist conception of politics; Dirk Berg-Schlosser and 
Theo Stammen, Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft (Munich: Beck, 
1995), 25–26.
6 Cf. Berg-Schlosser and Stammen, Einführung in die Politikwissenschaft, 
25–26.
7 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 310. After reviewing the 
publications of historians, political scientists, and sociologists on Weber’s 
reflections on politics, Hans Henrik Bruun states that their “results have 
been roughly the same: conflict and power are, in Weber’s view, the fun-
damental conditions of political activity”; Hans Henrik Bruun, Science, 
Values and Politics in Max Weber’s Methodology, New Expanded Edition 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 239.
8 Max Weber, “Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Politi-
cal Order,” Weber. Political Writings, 219. For the political context of We-
ber’s time, for his nationalism and the “imperialist power-state he desired” 
see Stephen P. Turner, and Regis A. Factor, Max Weber and the Dispute 
over Reason and Value: A Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics (London: 
Routledge, 1984), 10, 7–29. 
9 Max Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” Max Weber, 
The Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans. and ed. Edward Shills and 
Henry Finch (Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1949),57; trans. slightly 
changed by M.K.
10 Max Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’ in Sociology and Eco-
nomics,” Weber, The Methodology of the Social Sciences, 7–18. Emphasis 2 
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politics is, for Weber, to fight out this struggle of antinomic values 
and ideals.
Weber holds the pluralism and struggle of opposing values to be a 
characteristic feature of modernity. This struggle was halted in Eu-
rope for centuries through the unchallenged prevalence of Chris-
tianity, which brought about cultural unity. However, after the de-
mise of the Christian world view, it broke out again.11 For Weber, 
it is a “fundamental fact” that modern man “is destined to live in 
a godless and prophetless time.”12 This diagnosis is a reformula-
tion of Nietzsche’s famous statement “God is dead,” which means 
“that the belief in the Christian God has become unbelievable.”13 
Weber accepts Nietzsche’s diagnosis, but not his “prophecy” of the 
“Übermensch.” Nevertheless, the first thesis of this article claims 
that Weber’s theory of a clash of irreconcilable values goes back 
to Nietzsche. Although the Kantian or neo-Kantian influence on 
Weber’s methodology cannot be denied, it is often overstated in 
the literature, which frequently neglects Nietzsche’s importance 
for his thought.14
through letter-spacing by Weber in the German original. All German words 
in the translations of Weber’s writings are inserted by M.K. In his article, 
Kenneth Westphal argues that, strictly speaking, “values do not clash,” but 
only people who pursue what they value; Kenneth R. Westphal, “Cosmo-
politanism without Commensurability: Why Incommensurable Values are 
Worthless,” Jahrbuch für Recht und Ethik 27 (2019): 243-44. However, nei-
ther Nietzsche nor Weber make such subtle distinctions.
11 Max Weber, “Science as Vocation,” From Max Weber. Essays in Sociology, 
148-49. 
12 Weber, “Science as Vocation,” 153.
13 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. J. Nauckhoff (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), III 125, V 343; 119-20, 199. 
14 Weber does refer several times to Heinrich Rickert and his term “value 
relation” (Wertbeziehung); Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and So-
cial Policy,” 76–77, 81; and Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 
21–22; cf. Bruun, Science, Values and Politics, 20-21. Interpreters who claim 
a strong Kantian or neo-Kantian influence on Weber are Agathe Bienfait, 
Freiheit, Verantwortung, Solidarität. Zur Rekonstruktion des politischen 
Liberalismus (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1999), 130-71; and Wolfgang 
Schluchter, Religion und Lebensführung, Bd. 1: Studien zu Max Webers Kul-
tur- und Werttheorie (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1988). Hans Henrik 
Bruun claims, “Value freedom was at the heart of the methodological views 
of Kant and the neo-Kantians, who provided Weber with the philosophical 
platform from which he was able to conduct his determined attacks on na-
ïve historicism, emanationism, vulgar Marxism, and positivism. Properly 
understood, it is also the logical corollary of his central thesis of the value 
conflict”; Bruun, Science, Values and Politics, 11.
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Maybe the most important part of Weber’s “The Profession and 
Vocation of Politics” is his discussion of the relation of politics and 
ethics. Weber refuses both the interpretation that they are unre-
lated and the view that one single approach to ethics is able to 
regulate all spheres of human conduct.15 Weber’s discussion of the 
relation of politics and ethics is linked to his philosophy of science 
and in particular to his methodological thoughts on “ethical neu-
trality” (Wertfreiheit)16 of the social sciences. This well-known pos-
tulate means primarily that social scientists are unable to scientifi-
cally demonstrate which practical phenomena are “approvable” 
(billigenswert) and which ones are “objectionable” (verwerflich).17 
In short, “value-judgments” (Wertungen) cannot be assessed sci-
entifically. Social scientists should clearly distinguish the spheres 
of “is” and “ought,” or of facts and values.18 Weber asks for a strict 
separation of “purely logically deducible and empirical factual as-
sertions on the one hand, and practical, ethical or philosophical 
value-judgments on the other.”19 He holds such strict separation 
not only to be possible, but to be an “imperative requirement of 
intellectual honesty” (intellektuelle Rechtschaffenheit) and “a spe-
cific virtue” and “duty” of the academic teacher.20
Weber’s views on “ethical neutrality” (Wertfreiheit) and a clear 
distinction between the spheres of “is” and “ought,” or of facts 
and norms, entails that a scientist should not commit the fallacy 
15 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 357; cf. 357–368. 
16 “Ethical neutrality” is a very free and interpretative but fitting translation 
of what Weber means in his German title with “Wertfreiheit.” In “Der Sinn 
der ‘Wertfreiheit’ der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaften,” 
for good reasons Weber puts “Wertfreiheit” in quotation marks. It seems 
that Weber chose the term “Wertfreiheit” due to a lack of a better term. 
Translated literally, in the title “Wertfreiheit” would mean that the social 
and economic sciences are “value-free,” which, of course, is not the case. 
Already the initial scientific act of singling out a research topic implies the 
value-judgment that this topic is worth knowing or researching. Weber is 
aware of that; Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” 72, 
76-77; Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 22.
17 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 1.
18 Bruun points out that “Weber was certainly not the author of the theory 
of logical disjunction between ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’, on which the demand for 
value freedom is based”; Bruun, Science, Values and Politics, 12.
19 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 1.
20 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 2-3; Weber, “Science as Vo-
cation,” 146, 155-56. 
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of deriving “ought” from “is.” Despite the limits of the social sci-
ences and reason, sociology is able to empirically study normative 
phenomena such as values and ideals. The social sciences can, 
e.g. achieve a clear understanding of the relations among differ-
ent “value-judgments” or values and of the means necessary to 
realize them through political action. Regardless of these possible 
achievements, neither social scientists nor philosophers are able 
to assess “value-judgments” scientifically as desirable or reprehen-
sible. In this context, Weber emphasizes “the ‘limits’ of ethics.”21 
According to the second thesis of this article, the general claim of 
Weber’s philosophy of science is that there is no possibility of an 
ultimate rational, philosophical, or scientific grounding of values 
and normative theories. Weber’s position still poses a serious chal-
lenge to both contemporary ethical theories and normative theo-
ries of justice, which have been propagated for some decades now.
In his discussion of the relation of politics and ethics, Weber dis-
tinguishes between two kinds of “ethically oriented activity” and 
two corresponding approaches to ethics that are opposed to each 
other. Human actions can follow an “ethics of conviction” (Gesin-
nungsethik) or an “ethics of responsibility” (Verantwortungsethik).22 
In “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” Weber argues that 
while an ethics of responsibility is appropriate for the sphere of 
politics, and ethics of conviction is not.23 Weber’s endorsement of 
an ethics of responsibility in the field of politics led to the criticism 
that he contradicts his postulate of the “ethical neutrality” (Wert-
21 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 15.
22 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 359. In this translation, 
“Gesinnungsethik” und “Verantwortungsethik” have been rendered with 
“ethic of conviction” and “ethic of responsibility.” The reason for the trans-
lation of “Ethik” with “ethic” (and not with “ethics”) is likely that before 
Weber introduces these terms he declares that the last problem he wants 
to discuss in his talk is the “ethos of politics as a ‘cause’ [Sache]”; Weber, 
“The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 355. The meaning of the term 
“ethic” is closer to “ethos” than to “ethics,” the term Weber actually uses. 
Therefore, I have changed the term “ethic” in the translations everywhere 
to “ethics.” 
23 Bruun challenges the prevailing view that “Weber saw the ethic of respon-
sibility as the appropriate one for the politician”; Bruun, Science, Values 
and Politics, 49, 259. The last section of this paper defends the prevailing 
view and argues against Bruun’s interpretation. 
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freiheit) of the scientist.24 According to the third thesis of this arti-
cle, Weber’s arguments for a political ethics of responsibility are 
compatible with his methodological postulate.
WEBER’S THEORY OF VALUE CONFLICT AND NIETZSCHE’S 
INFLUENCE
The first thesis of this article claims that Nietzsche is the main 
source of Max Weber’s theory of clash of irreconcilable values. Ni-
etzsche’s influence on Weber has already been noticed and debat-
ed in the literature.25 For one thing, Weber’s conception of “intel-
lectual honesty” (intellektuelle Rechtschaffenheit) as a virtue clearly 
goes back to Nietzsche.26 For another thing, Weber’s realist under-
standing of politics as struggle is informed by Nietzsche’s concep-
tion of the “will to power.” According to Weber, it is a “self-evident 
24 Lothar Waas, Max Weber und die Folgen. Die Krise der Moderne und der 
moralisch-politische Dualismus des 20. Jahrhunderts (Frankfurt am Main / 
New York: Campus, 1995), 22.
25 Andrea Gerner, Wissenschaft und Leben. Max Webers Antwort auf eine 
Frage Friedrich Nietzsches (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994); 
Wilhelm Hennis, “Die Spuren Nietzsches im Werk Max Webers,” ed. 
Wilhelm Hennis, Max Webers Fragestellung. Studien zur Biographie des 
Werkes (Tübingen: Mohr / Siebeck, 1987), 167-91; Detlev Peukert, Max We-
bers Diagnose der Moderne (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1989); 
Christian Schwaabe, Freiheit und Vernunft in der unversöhnten Moderne. 
Max Webers kritischer Dezisionismus als Herausforderung des politischen 
Liberalismus (München: Fink, 2002); Christian Schwaabe, “Das Schicksal 
des Menschen im Schatten des toten Gottes. Zur Bedeutung Friedrich Ni-
etzsches für Max Webers Diagnose der Moderne,” Der Wille zur Macht und 
die “große Politik” – Friedrich Nietzsches Staatsverständnis, ed. Hans-Mar-
tin Schönherr-Mann (Baden Baden: Nomos, 2010), 235-57; Tamsin Shaw, 
“The ‘Last Man’ Problem: Nietzsche and Weber on Political Attitudes to 
Suffering,” Nietzsche as Political Philosopher, eds. Manuel Knoll and Barry 
Stocker (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2014), 345-80. For several other refer-
ences, in particular to the Anglophone literature, see Bruun, Science, Val-
ues and Politics, 40.
26 Nietzsche suggests that intellectual “honesty” (Redlichkeit) is the “virtue 
from which we cannot get away, we free spirits”; Friedrich Nietzsche, Be-
yond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 
VII 227; 155; cf. Manuel Knoll, “Nietzsches Kritik am Willen zum Wissen 
und die intellektuelle Tugend der Redlichkeit,” Nietzsches Wissenschaft-
sphilosophie. Hintergründe, Wirkungen und Aktualität, ed. Günther Abel, 
and Marco Brusotti, and Helmut Heit (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 257-70.
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fact that the will to power is one of the driving motives” of politi-
cal leaders.27 Weber’s realist understanding of politics and of the 
clash of irreconcilable values can be traced farther back to Machi-
avelli. According to Isaiah Berlin, it is a fundamental achievement 
of Machiavelli that he discovered that the pluralism and struggle 
of values is part of the “normal human situation” and that “ends 
equally ultimate, equally sacred” and “entire systems of value” 
“come into collision without possibility of rational arbitration.”28 
The parallels between Weber’s and Nietzsche’s philosophy and, as 
will be explained later, between Weber’s and Machiavelli’s thought 
are no coincidence. Machiavelli was among the thinkers Nietzsche 
appreciated most. Nietzsche declares, “Thucydides, and perhaps 
Machiavelli’s Principe, are most closely related to me in terms of 
their unconditional will not to be fooled and to see reason in real-
ity, – not in ‘reason,’ and even less in ‘morality’.”29
In Zarathustra, Nietzsche has his protagonist make several state-
ments of what appears to be his own view of values and their ori-
gin. In one of them Zarathustra explains,
Indeed, humans gave themselves all their good and evil. Indeed, they 
did not take it, they did not find it, it did not fall onto them as a voice 
from the heavens. Humans first placed values into things, in order to 
preserve themselves, – they first created meaning for things, a human 
meaning! That is why they call themselves ‘human,’ that is: the valuator 
[der Schätzende].30
Nietzsche rejects the claim of the three main monotheistic re-
ligions that God gives humans their values and moral command-
ments. He also refuses Plato’s version of “ethical realism” and 
“cognitivism.”31 Plato holds the good to be an objective moral 
27 Max Weber, “Parliament and Government in Germany under a New Politi-
cal Order,” 176; cf. Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 354.
28 Isaiah Berlin, “The Originality of Machiavelli,” Isaiah Berlin, Against the 
Current. Essays in the History of Ideas, ed. Henry Hardy (Princeton: Prince-
ton University Press, 2013), 94; cf. 94-99.
29 Friedrich Nietzsche, Twighlight of the Idols, Friedrich Nietzsche, The An-
tichrist, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and other Writings, trans. J. Nor-
man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), “What I Owe the An-
cients 2,” 225. 
30 Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. A. del Caro; slightly 
changed by M.K. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), “Part I: 
On a Thousand and One Goals,” 43.
31 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 2.
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reality about which moral knowledge can be achieved. For Ni-
etzsche, moral facts and moral knowledge do not exist: “There 
are no moral phenomena at all, but only a moral interpretation 
of phenomena.”32 There is only a pluralism of values and of con-
ceptions of the good. All values and meanings depend on human 
interpretations and value-judgments. Values and moral codes are 
not discovered but invented by peoples according to their needs. 
In line with this, Weber explains, “The fate of an epoch which has 
eaten of the tree of knowledge is that it must know that we can-
not learn the meaning of the world from the results of its analysis, 
be it ever so perfect, it must rather be in a position to create this 
meaning itself.”33 According to Nietzsche, different peoples have 
different cultural perspectives and thus different values and moral 
codes that serve for their self-preservation. They are the expression 
of a people’s “will to power” and of what they love and detest.34 
Creating values and meanings is an essential characteristic of the 
human being as “valuator.”35 This is a remarkable “anthropologi-
cal” statement because it makes the plausible claim that creating 
values is an essential characteristic of humans. For Nietzsche, the 
creation of new values usually entails the necessity of the destruc-
tion of old ones, “Change of values – that is the change of creators. 
Whoever must be a creator always annihilates.”36 This is a first in-
dication that Nietzsche holds clash of values to be an essential part 
of world history.
Nietzsche elaborates his view of struggle between opposing val-
ues in his polemical writing On the Genealogy of Morality, which 
Max Weber calls a “brilliant essay.”37 In it Nietzsche explains,
The two opposing values “good and bad,” “good and evil” have fought 
a terrible battle for thousands of years on earth; and although the latter 
has been dominant for a long time, there is still no lack of places where 
32 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, IV 108; 85. 
33 Weber, “‘Objectivity’ in Social Science and Social Policy,” 57.
34 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Part II: On Self-Overcoming,” 88-90. 
35 Cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, trans. C. Diethe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), II 8; 45-46. 
36 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Part I: On a Thousand and One Goals,” 
43; cf. Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, “Part II: On Self-Overcoming,” 
88-90.
37 Max Weber, “The Social Psychology of the World Religions,” From Max 
Weber, 270; cf. 190.
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the battle remains undecided. You could even say that, in the mean-
time, it has reached ever greater heights but at the same time has be-
come ever deeper and more intellectual: so that there is, today, perhaps 
no more distinguishing feature of the “higher nature,” the intellectual 
nature, than to be divided in this sense and to be really and truly a bat-
tle ground for these opposites. The symbol of this fight, written in a 
script which has hitherto remained legible throughout human history, 
is “Rome against Judea, Judea against Rome”: – up to now there has 
been no greater event than this battle, this question, this contradiction 
of mortal enemies.38 
In the first essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche offers his “hypoth-
eses on descent” (Herkunfts-Hypothesen) regarding morality and 
intends to give a real “history of morality” that seems to be set 
against the Egyptian enslavement of Jews that presumably lasted 
for 400 years.39 According to Nietzsche’s hypotheses, there are two 
opposing value-judgments, “good and bad” and “good and evil,” 
which go back to two distinct social carriers. First is a caste of aris-
tocratic, strong, and healthy warriors who conceive of themselves 
as “good” and look down at subjected peoples or their subjects as 
“bad.” Against this “chivalric-aristocratic method” of evaluation, 
a caste of subdued but clever Jewish priests launches a success-
ful and “radical revaluation of their values.”40 Driven by hatred, 
resentment, and the desire for intellectual revenge, Jewish priests 
condemn the warriors and their values as “evil” or immoral and 
conceive of themselves as “good” and moral. In Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche calls these two types of moralities “master-moral-
ity” and “slave-morality.”41 Historically, the “priestly method of 
evaluation” of Jews, which was continued by Christian priests, led 
to a centuries-long prevalence of Judeo-Christian morality, which 
adds the ethics of Christ’s “Sermon on the Mount” to the six of the 
ten commandments with moral content.42 Despite this historical 
38 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, I 16; trans. slightly changed by 
M.K., 31-32.
39 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 4 and 7; 6 and 8. One might also 
think of the period in Jewish history referred to as “Babylonian Captivity” 
or “Babylonian exile.” 
40 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, I 7; 16-17. 
41 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, IX: 260; 204. Nietzsche introduces these 
two types of morality for the first time in Human, All Too Human, I 45.
42 For Weber’s interpretation of “the ethics of the Sermon on the Mount” see 
Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 357-59, and Weber, “Sci-
ence as Vocation,” 148. 
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defeat of the “noble method of valuing,” Nietzsche still hopes for 
a revitalization of “Roman” or “aristocratic values” and thus an-
other revaluation of values.43 Such a revitalization, which he holds 
to be crucial for “the well being and future of the human race,” had 
already happened briefly during the Italian Renaissance.44 And it 
could happen again as a consequence of the decline of Christianity 
since the Enlightenment period. 
The influence of Nietzsche’s account of a struggle of antinomic 
values can easily be traced in Weber’s theory of value conflict. In 
“The Profession and Vocation of Science,” Weber summarized 
some of his basic ideas on the “polytheism” and conflict of values. 
This summary is in line with related statements in his article on 
“ethical neutrality” (Wertfreiheit),
To “scientifically” advocate practical views is impossible – except in the 
case of debating the means for a fixed given aim – due to more fun-
damental reasons. It is meaningless in principle because the various 
value spheres of the world stand in irreconcilable conflict with each 
other. The elder Mill, whose philosophy I will not praise otherwise, 
was on this point right when he said: If one proceeds from pure experi-
ence, one arrives at polytheism. […] something can be sacred not only 
in spite of its not being beautiful, but rather because and in so far it 
is not beautiful. […] And, since Nietzsche, we realize that something 
can be beautiful, not only in spite of the aspect in which it is not good, 
but rather in that very aspect. […] It is commonplace to observe that 
something may be true although it is not beautiful and not holy and 
not good. Indeed it may be true in precisely these aspects. But all these 
are only the most elementary cases of the struggle that the gods of the 
various orders and values are engaged in. I do not know how one might 
wish to decide “scientifically” the value of French and German culture; 
for here, too, different gods struggle with one another, now and for all 
times to come.45
In this quotation, Weber expresses two of his central claims about 
values. First, values or “value-judgments” cannot be assessed sci-
entifically as approvable or objectionable. Weber illustrates this 
with the example that it is impossible to scientifically assess and 
43 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, I 16; 32.
44 Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, I 16; 33. 
45 Weber, “Science as Vocation,” 147-48. The translation of the first phrase of 
this quotation has been completely revised by M.K. This was also neces-
sary because many words and a whole embedded clause were left out by 
the original translation.
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compare the value of the French and German culture. There exists 
no given or predefined “hierarchical ordering of values.”46 A few 
phrases later he argues that any attempt to “‘refute scientifically’ 
the ethic of the “Sermon on the Mount” and its request to “turn 
the other cheek” would be presumptuous. Second, he elucidates 
that radical pluralism and conflicts of values exist even on the most 
fundamental level. For many centuries, as previously in Plato’s 
philosophy, in the Christian world view, different value spheres 
were successfully combined into a coherent unity. After the de-
cline of Christianity in the modern world, however, this unity of 
the holy, the beautiful, the good, and the true breaks apart. As a 
consequence, the distinctions between the different value spheres 
and their antagonisms become again visible.
In another important passage from “The Profession and Voca-
tion of Science,” Weber explains what he holds to be the conse-
quence of the limits of the social science, philosophy, and reason 
in general. As values or “value-judgments” cannot be assessed 
scientifically, one has no other option than to decide which ones 
are desirable and which ones reprehensible. This is usually called 
“a ‘decisionist’ view of the value choices one must make in life.”47 
Weber’s friend, the legal scholar Gustav Radbruch, explicitly de-
clared that the philosophy of law should be “decisionistic.”48 In a 
footnote to his article on “ethical neutrality,” Weber refers to Rad-
bruch as someone who had previously addressed “the ‘irreconcil-
ability’ [Unaustragbarkeit] of certain ultimate evaluations in a cer-
tain sphere of problems.”49 The German term “Unaustragbarkeit,” 
which is rendered here with “irreconcilability” (Unvereinbarkeit, 
Unverträglichkeit), is difficult to translate. However, it is central for 
an appropriate understanding of Weber’s thought. Weber also uses 
46 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 19.
47 Turner, and Factor, Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value: A 
Study in Philosophy, Ethics, and Politics, 2.
48 Gustav Radbruch, “Anglo-American Jurisprudence Through Continental 
Eyes,” Law Quarterly Review 208 (1936): 544.
49 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 10-11. Weber refers to the 
second edition of Radbruch’s Einführung in die Rechtswissenschaft from 
1913, which had been first published in 1910; Gustav Radbruch, Einfüh-
rung in die Rechtswissenschaft, 2nd. edition (Leipzig: Quelle & Meyer, 
1913). Weber explains about his relation to Radbruch’s views, “I diverge 
from him on certain problems but these are of no significance for the prob-
lem discussed here”; Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 11.
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this term in “The Profession and Vocation of Science” in the con-
text of his “decisionism,” 
This proposition, which I present here, always takes its point of depar-
ture from the one fundamental fact, that so long as life remains im-
manent and is interpreted in its own terms, it knows only of an unceas-
ing struggle of these gods [i.e. these opposed values] with one another. 
Or speaking directly, the ultimately possible attitudes toward life are 
irreconcilable, and hence their struggle can never be brought to a fi-
nal conclusion [die Unvereinbarkeit und also die Unaustragbarkeit des 
Kampfes]. Thus it is necessary to make a decisive choice.50 
In this quotation, the noun “Unaustragbarkeit” is rendered with 
“can never be brought to a final conclusion.” The related adjective 
is “unaustragbar,” the associated verb “austragen.” If something 
is “unaustragbar” in an intellectual context, it cannot be definitely 
and conclusively argued out. However, “Unaustragbarkeit” does 
not mean that one cannot argue at all. One can, of course, sup-
port views and values with reasons and arguments. As the next sec-
tion will argue, in Weber’s writings the term “Unaustragbarkeit” is 
about the impossibility of a rational “Letztbegründung,” i.e., about 
the impossibility of an ultimate rational grounding. 
THE ARGUMENTATIVE LIMITS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND 
ETHICS
According to the second thesis of this article, the general claim of 
Weber’s philosophy of science is that there is no possibility of an 
ultimate rational, philosophical, or scientific grounding of values 
and normative theories. However, the social sciences are able to 
empirically study normative phenomena such as values and ideals. 
An empirical scientific discipline is e.g. capable of demonstrating 
which means and repercussions are inevitable for actions derived 
from “practical political evaluations (Wertungen).”51 In his article 
on “ethical neutrality” (Wertfreiheit), Weber discusses not only the 
social sciences, but philosophical disciplines such as ethics and 
their relation to value-judgments; “P h i l o s o p h i c a l  disciplines 
can go further [than empirical ones] and lay bare the ‘meaning’ of 
50 Weber, “Science as Vocation,” 152. 
51 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 18.
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evaluations, i.e., their ultimate m e a n i n g f u l  structure and 
their meaningful consequences, in other words, they can indicate 
their ‘place’ within the totality of all the possible ‘ultimate’ evalu-
ations and delimit their spheres of meaningful validity.”52 In gen-
eral, through the “discussion of p r a c t i c a l  v a l u e-j u d g e m 
e n t s” (p r a k t i s c h e  W e r t u n g e n) one can achieve a clear 
understanding of them and answer several important questions: 
(a) What are “the ultimate, internally ‘consistent’ value-axioms”?53 
(b) Which “implications” (Konsequenzen) for “practical evaluation 
of factual situations” are to be deduced from these ultimate val-
ue-axioms? (c) Which are the “factual consequences” and “unde-
sired repercussions” if certain “practical evaluations” are realized 
through action? (d) Which “new axioms (and the postulates to be 
drawn from them)” can be uncovered?54
Despite these possible achievements of a “discussion of p r a c t 
i c a l  v a l u e-j u d g e m e n t s,” Weber emphasizes the argumen-
tative limits of both the social sciences and ethics in regard to a 
rational or scientific grounding of values. After mentioning the po-
tential accomplishments of the “p h i l o s o p h i c a l  disciplines,” 
Weber makes a crucial statement that addresses once more his 
“decisionism,”
Even such simple questions as the extent to which an end should sanc-
tion unavoidable means, or the extent to which undesired repercus-
sions [Nebenerfolge] should be taken into consideration, or how con-
flicts between several concretely conflicting ends are to be arbitrated 
[schlichten], are entirely matters of choice [Wahl] or compromise. 
There is no (rational or empirical) scientific procedure [Verfahren] of 
any kind whatsoever which can provide us with a decision [Entschei-
dung] here. The social sciences, which are strictly empirical sciences, 
are the least fitted to presume to save the individual the difficulty of 
making a choice, and they should therefore not create the impression 
that they can do so.55
52 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 18; emphasis through letter-
spacing by Weber in the German original.
53 Weber does not give unequivocal examples of ultimate value-axioms. He 
might have in mind the ultimate values of nationalists, socialists, pacifists, 
or believers in a religion and their respective opposites; emphasis through 
letter-spacing by Weber in the German original.
54 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 20-21.
55 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 18-19.
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The problem of the extent to which an end is able to “sanction 
unavoidable means” is a central question of Machiavelli’s and We-
ber’s thoughts on the relation of politics and ethics. In “The Pro-
fession and Vocation of Politics,” Weber declares about this ques-
tion that no “ethics in the world” is able to “determine when and 
to what extent the ethically good end ‘sanctifies’ the ethically dan-
gerous means and side-effects.”56 Weber’s point about the limits 
of scientific reason could be illustrated by referring to recent de-
bates on “humanitarian interventions.” How should it be possible 
to ethically or scientifically determine whether a coalition of well-
meaning states would be justified to cause the death of 100,000 or 
even more innocent civilians to stop a genocide committed by an 
evil government through military strikes against its cities? Similar 
limits of reason come in sight when the question arises of how to 
scientifically determine which one of two or more conflicting ends 
or values is more desirable or worth choosing. How can one, e.g., 
scientifically decide the dispute between a localist, a nationalist, 
and a cosmopolitan about the questions of whether we all belong 
to a single community or which community morally deserves our 
primary political loyalty? In such a debate all three will be able to 
defend their views with reasons and arguments. And for practi-
cal purposes they could find or agree to a political compromise 
despite their opposed views. However, for good reasons Weber 
claims in a key phrase of his article on “ethical neutrality” (Wert-
freiheit), “There is no (rational or empirical) scientific procedure of 
any kind whatsoever which can provide us with a decision here.” 
This means that value conflicts cannot be definitely and conclu-
sively argued out. For Weber, an ultimate rational grounding of 
values, norm or ideals is impossible. 
In the context of his key phrase Weber does not indicate whether 
he criticizes specific rational or empirical scientific procedures 
that have been proposed to solve conflicts between values, norms, 
and ideals. It seems quite clear that it is impossible to solve a con-
flict between antagonistic values applying an empirical scientific 
procedure. However, in contemporary political philosophy, John 
Rawls proposed such a procedure to resolve conflicts between 
conceptions of justice. He claims that a democratic political cul-
ture contains “considered judgments” about justice such as “reli-
56 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 360.
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gious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust.”57 Accord-
ing to Rawls’s coherence theory, it is possible to extract both such 
“settled convictions” and “recognized basic ideas and principles” 
about justice from a “public political culture” and to seek to com-
bine them “into a coherent conception of justice.”58 However, the 
citizens of democratic political cultures display a plurality of an-
tagonistic “considered judgments” about justice. There are liberals 
and libertarians, conservatives and socialists, and such like who 
disagree about conceptions of justice. Conflicts among values, 
norms, ideals, and “considered judgments” are part of one and the 
same political culture. Therefore, it is impossible to derive one “co-
herent conception of justice” from it. 
In his Theory of Justice, Rawls proposes also a rational scientific 
procedure to decide between competing conceptions of justice. 
This is his “contractarian method,” which derives principles of jus-
tice from a list of conceptions in an original position, integrating 
elements of “the theory of rational choice.”59 However, Rawls later 
stated that it was a misleading error “to describe a theory of justice 
as part of the theory of rational choice.”60 Nevertheless, in ethics 
57 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1971), §§ 4, 9; 19, 46-53; John Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Po-
litical not Metaphysical,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 14 (1984): 228.
58 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” 228; John Rawls, 
Political Liberalism Expanded edition (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2005), 8.
59 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, §§ 3, 21; 16-17, 123-24. 
60 Rawls, “Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical,” 237 (fn. 20). As 
early as 1980, Rawls reinterprets his theory of justice as fairness under the 
title “Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980,” 
The Journal of Philosophy 77 (1980). According to Rawls’s “Kantian Con-
structivism,” the principles of justice are the outcome of a specific “proce-
dure of construction,” which is conducted by rational agents. In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls introduces the distinction between “moral and political 
constructivism” and defends, in line with narrowing down his theory to a 
“strictly political conception of justice,” only the latter; Rawls, Political 
Liberalism, XV, 90 (fn. 1). In Political Liberalism, Rawls’s “political con-
structivism” is linked to his method of “reflective equilibrium,” which pre-
supposes his “coherence theory”; Rawls, Political Liberalism, 8, 89, 95. In A 
Theory of Justice, the method of “reflective equilibrium” is linked to his 
“contractarian method” and “the theory of rational choice.” For argu-
ments that claim that Rawls’s empirical and rational scientific procedures, 
which aim at resolving conflicts between conceptions of justice, are not 
successful and which explain why, see Manuel Knoll, “Deep Disagree-
ments on Social and Political Justice: Their Meta-Ethical Relevance and 2 
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it is possible to conceive of rational procedures to solve a conflict 
between values, norms, and ideals. Take the conflict or disagree-
ment between an ethical realist and cognitivist such as Plato and 
an anti-realist and moral skeptic. Plato claims both that an objec-
tive moral reality, primarily the form of the good, exists and that 
philosophers are able to achieve truth about it. If a philosopher 
who defended Plato’s view, or a position similar to it, were able 
to both cogently demonstrate that such an objective moral reality 
exists and to successfully communicate his knowledge about it, he 
could refute the anti-realist who denies moral facts and the moral 
skeptic who rejects the possibility of moral truth. In this case, such 
a philosopher could solve value conflicts by pointing to his moral 
truths and use them as a standard to assess antagonistic values. In 
mainstream sciences, practitioners disagree with each other, say, 
about aspects of climate change, but there is some agreement on 
the methods and procedures how to settle or resolve such disa-
greements. However, “nothing remotely comparable” exists among 
moralists or moral philosophers.61 Until today, ethical realists keep 
quarreling with anti-realists, and cognitivists with moral skeptics.  
In both ethics and political philosophy, justice is a central virtue 
or value. In his article on “ethical neutrality” (Wertfreiheit), We-
ber illustrates “the ‘limits’ of ethics” by referring to disagreements 
about social and political justice, 
The implications of the postulate of ‘justice’ cannot be decided un-
ambiguously by any ethic. Whether one, for example – as would cor-
respond most closely with the views expressed by Schmoller – owes 
much to those who achieve much or whether one should demand 
much from those who accomplish much; whether one should, e. g., in 
the name of justice […] accord great opportunities to those with emi-
nent talents or whether on the contrary (like Babeuf) one should at-
tempt to equalize the injustice of the unequal distribution of mental 
capacities through the rigorous provision that talented persons, whose 
talent gives them prestige, must not utilize their better opportunities 
for their own benefit – these questions cannot be definitely answered 
the Need for a New Research Perspective,” New Perspectives on Distribu-
tive Justice. Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus, 
eds. Manuel Knoll, Stephen Snyder, and Nurdane Şimşek (Berlin / Boston: 
De Gruyter, 2019).
61 Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 178.
Dîvân
2019 / 2
128
Manuel Knoll
[dürfte aus “ethischen Prämissen” unaustragbar sein]. The ethical prob-
lem in most social-political issues is, however, of this type.”62
In the literature, this passage has been discussed under the name 
of “Weber’s ‘Babeuf’ antinomy.”63 However, in the dense and com-
plex passage Weber shows that it is a distinctive feature of moder-
nity that there exist not only irreconcilable conceptions of the good 
but of justice.64 Weber refers not only to Babeuf’s view of distributive 
justice, but to several irreconcilable interpretations of “the postu-
late of ‘justice’,” e.g. the conflict of the performance principle with 
what Rawls calls the “principle of redress.”65 Weber’s main point is 
that the disagreement between these irreconcilable conceptions of 
justice “cannot be conclusively argued out based on ‘ethical prem-
ises’ (dürfte aus “ethischen Prämissen” unaustragbar sein).” In the 
last phrase of the passage, Weber makes clear that such “‘limits’ 
of ethics” apply most “social-political issues.” Though moral and 
political philosophers can give arguments, they cannot deliver an 
undisputable rational grounding for any of their different norma-
tive theories. There is no possibility of an ultimate rational, philo-
sophical, or scientific grounding of values and normative theories. 
As already mentioned, Weber’s position poses a serious challenge 
to both contemporary ethical theories and normative theories of 
justice. This is in particular true for neo-Kantians such as Rawls, 
who aim at an “overlapping consensus,” or Habermas, who be-
lieves that unimpeded discourses and arguments based on com-
municative reason are generally able to lead to consensus in moral 
issues. Weber’s criticism does not mean that practical philosophy 
is impossible but that it should have more modest aims. In 1978, 
Walter Gölz published his monograph on the problems of giving 
cogent reasons in practical philosophy. After reviewing all the rel-
evant literature, he concludes that until today no one was able to 
refute Max Weber’s theses on the limits of rational grounding.66 
62 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 15-16. 
63 Turner and Factor, Max Weber and the Dispute over Reason and Value, 35.
64 From Weber’s perspective, Rawls’s move to come to terms with the op-
posing conceptions of the good by striving for an agreement on a political 
conception of justice and a just social framework that allows these concep-
tion to coexist does not work.
65 For an overview on these irreconcilable conceptions of social and political 
justice see Knoll, “Deep Disagreements on Social and Political Justice,” 31-
39.
66 Walter Gölz, Begründungsprobleme der praktischen Philosophie (Stuttgart 
/ Bad Cannstadt: Fromann-Holzboog, 1978), 12. Gölz agrees with the 2 
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THE RELATION OF POLITICS AND ETHICS AND WEBER’S 
DEFENSE OF AN ETHICS OF RESPONSIBILITY
In “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” Weber distinguish-
es between two approaches to ethics that are opposed to each 
other. “Ethically oriented” human behavior can follow an “ethics 
of conviction” (Gesinnungsethik) or an “ethics of responsibility” 
(Verantwortungsethik). In more contemporary terms, this clash 
of approaches to ethics is a conflict between a deontological and 
a consequentialist ethics.67 Weber argues that only the latter, an 
ethics of responsibility, is appropriate for the sphere of politics. As 
already mentioned, his endorsement of an ethics of responsibility 
led to the criticism that Weber contradicts his postulate of “ethi-
cal neutrality (Wertfreiheit).”68 This section substantiates the third 
second thesis of this article. According to Gölz, for Weber there is no pos-
sibility of “an exhaustive, i.e. complete and sufficient” rational grounding 
of statements about norms and values; Gölz, Begründungsprobleme der 
praktischen Philosophie, 14.
67 A deontological ethics claims that certain actions are always right or wrong 
in certain situations, no matter what the consequences are. For example, 
for a deontological ethics like Kant’s lying or stealing are wrong actions in 
all situations; cf. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London: Keg-
an Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1930), 206. A consequentialist eth-
ics, on the contrary, holds that the judgment about the moral rightness or 
wrongness of an action depends exclusively on the quality of its foreseeable 
consequences. An action is right if, and only if, it has more good than bad 
consequences. Every consequentialist ethics contains a value theory that 
establishes which consequences of actions are desirable or valuable. Jer-
emy Bentham, the founder of both Utilitarianism and modern consequen-
tialism, embraces only one value which he calls “utility.” For him, utility is 
defined as the individual or common happiness or pleasure that is caused 
by an action. Utility is not a moral value. Today, a type of consequentialist 
ethics that makes the moral rightness or wrongness of an action exclusive-
ly dependent on its non-moral consequences is defined as a teleological 
ethics. While some decades ago it was common to oppose a “teleological” 
ethics to a deontological one, in contemporary ethics and its terminology 
a consequentialist ethics is opposed to a deontological ethics. The term 
“consequentialism” became established in the wake of G.E.M. Anscombe‘s 
article “Modern Moral Philosophy,” which was published in 1958. The term 
was first coined in this paper; G.E.M. Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philoso-
phy,” Philosophy 33 / 124 (January 1958). Cf. Dieter Birnbacher, Analytische 
Einführung in die Ethik (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2003), 113-14.
68 Waas, Max Weber und die Folgen, 22.
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thesis of this article, according to which Weber’s endorsement is 
compatible with his postulate.69
The understanding of politics, on which Weber’s “The Profession 
and Vocation of Politics” is based, is a realist one. According to a 
political realist, politics is about power, struggle, and conflict. The 
pinnacle of Weber’s 1919 talk are his astute considerations on the 
relation of politics and ethics. Weber refuses both the interpreta-
tion that they have “nothing at all to do with one another” and the 
view “that political action is subject to ‘the same’ ethics as every 
other form of activity.”70 His rejection of the latter interpretation 
starts off with the insight that human actions belong to hetero-
geneous spheres and that it is therefore very difficult to ethically 
regulate them in a coherent way:
But is it in fact true that any ethics in the world could establish substan-
tially identical commandments [inhaltlich gleichen Gebote] applicable 
to all relationships, whether erotic, business, family or official, to one’s 
relations with one’s wife, greengrocer, son, competitor, with a friend or 
an accused man? Can the fact that politics operates with a quite spe-
cific means, namely power, backed up by the use of violence [Gewalt-
samkeit], really be a matter of such indifference as far as the ethical 
demands placed on politics are concerned?71
The use of violence is not only the “specific means,” but also the 
“decisive means” of politics. For Weber, the tasks of politics “can 
only be achieved by force [Gewalt].”72 Despite his conception of 
politics, Weber rejects the view that politics and ethics have noth-
69 Bruun criticizes historians, political scientists, and sociologists that they 
usually discuss Weber’s political views on power and conflict “in relative 
isolation from his theory of scientific inquiry”; Bruun, Science, Values and 
Politics, 239. 
70 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 357; cf. 357-68. Weber 
does not explain who are the protagonists of these two interpretations. 
The view that all forms of human activity are “subject to ‘the same’ ethics” 
might be derived from the view of the three main monotheistic religions, 
according to which God gave Moses his ten commandments, of which six 
express univocal ethical demands (Do not kill, etc.). 
71 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 357.
72 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 360, 366. Weber’s close 
association of political and military power has been criticized. Michael 
Mann argues, “True, the state uses force, but only as means to back up its 
rules, which are given no particular content”; Michael Mann, The Sourc-
es of Social Power, Vol. II: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760–1914 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 55.
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ing to do with each other. Rather, the unavoidable violence of po-
litical practice is the reason for political ethics: “The specific means 
of legitimate violence per se in the hands of human associations 
is what gives all the ethical problems of politics their particular 
character.”73
Weber’s realist conception of politics is crucial for understand-
ing his thought on the relation of politics to ethics. Weber distin-
guishes between two approaches to ethics that are opposed to 
each other,
That is the crucial point. We have to understand that ethically orient-
ed activity can follow two fundamentally different, irreconcilably op-
posed maxims [unaustragbar gegensätzlichen Maximen]. It can follow 
the ‘ethics of principled conviction’ (Gesinnung) or the ‘ethics of re-
sponsibility’. It is not that the ethics of conviction is identical with ir-
responsibility, nor that the ethic of responsibility means the absence of 
principled conviction – there is of course no question of that. But there 
is a profound opposition [abgrundtiefer Gegensatz] between acting by 
the maxim of the ethics of conviction (putting it in religious terms: ‘The 
Christian does what is right and places the outcome in God’s hands’), 
and acting by the maxim of the ethic of responsibility which means that 
one must answer for the (foreseeable) consequences of one’s actions.74
Weber illustrates the ethics of conviction with the Christian “eth-
ics of the Sermon on the Mount” that he understands as an “ab-
solute ethics” that asks its followers to “turn the other cheek.”75 
73 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 364.
74 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 359; cf. Weber, “The 
Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 16.
75 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 357. Bruun points out 
that there are three “variants of action motivated by an ethic of convic-
tion”: “the religious-acosmistic, the pacifist-political, and the radical-rev-
olutionary attitude”; Bruun, Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber’s 
Methodology, 251. The term “ethics of conviction” was first used by Wil-
helm Windelband in his “Geschichte der Philosophie” published in 1892. 
Windelband uses the term in the context of his presentation of Abelard’s 
and Kant’s ethics. In his Hauptprobleme der Ethik, published 1903, Paul 
Hensel uses the contrast of a “Gesinnungsethik” with a “Erfolgsethik.” 
As a representative of the latter he refers to Bentham’s Utilitarianism. Cf. 
Manuel Knoll, “Max Webers Machiavelli-Rezeption. Die Konsequenzen 
des politischen Realismus für das Verhältnis von Ethik und Politik,“ Der 
Machtstaat. Niccolò Machiavelli als Theoretiker der Macht im Spiegel der 
Zeit, eds. Volker Reinhardt, Rüdiger Voigt, and Stefano Saracino (Baden-
Baden: Nomos, 2015), 254.
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The ethics of conviction is not concerned about the consequences 
of actions. In the terminology of contemporary ethics, the ethics 
of conviction corresponds to a deontological ethics. The ethics 
of conviction is radically opposed to the ethics of responsibility. 
Someone who subscribes to the ethics of responsibility has a re-
alistic view of the shortcomings of human beings. Such a person 
“does not feel that he can shuffle off the consequences of his own 
actions, as far as he could foresee them, and place the burden on 
the shoulders of others. He will say, ‘These consequences are to be 
attributed to my actions’.”76 A person who is oriented by an ethic of 
responsibility acknowledges his responsibility for the consequenc-
es of his actions. In the terminology of contemporary ethics, the 
ethics of responsibility corresponds to a consequentialist ethics. 
Weber both denies that “the ethics of conviction is identical with 
irresponsibility” and claims that the ethics of responsibility does 
not mean “the absence of principled conviction.” The first means 
that a person who follows an ethics of conviction feels responsible 
for the purity of her intentions, “inner” principles, and values. The 
second indicates that a person who is oriented by an ethics of re-
sponsibility also has certain convictions, goals, and values. Weber 
even refers to exceptional situations, in which the ethics of respon-
sibility and the ethics of conviction are not “absolute opposites” 
but “complementary to each other [Ergänzungen].”77 Despite these 
76 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 360. The term “ethics 
of responsibility” was coined by Max Weber. He associates it with what 
already before him was called “Realpolitik” (as opposed to “Idealpolitik”). 
Weber transformed the term “ethics of success” (Erfolgsethik), which was 
current at his time, into the term “Verantwortungsethik”; cf. Knoll, “Max 
Webers Machiavelli-Rezeption,” 254. In 1906, Weber himself uses the term 
“Erfolgsethik,” which in the English translation is rendered erroneously 
with “ethics of ‘consequentialism’; Weber, “On the Situation of Constitu-
tional Democracy in Russia,” in Weber. Political Writings, 42. 
77 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 368. Such an exceptional 
situation arises when someone, “who acts on the basis of an ethics of re-
sponsibility, says at some point, ‘Here I stand, I can do no other’”; Weber, 
“The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 367. In this context, Bruuns 
claims that Weber distinguishes between “two ethics of conviction” and 
views one type, which he calls the “responsible ethic of conviction,” as the 
true “ethic of politics”; Bruun, Science, Values and Politics in Max Weber’s 
Methodology, 272; cf. 49. The problem of Bruun’s interpretation is that it 
fails to recognize that the so-called second type is just the expression of a 
very rare clash of the two approaches to ethics within one person that 
might occur only in exceptional situations. When Weber introduces the 2 
Dîvân
2019 / 2
133
Max Weber on Politics, Reason, and the Clash of Values and Approaches to Ethics
commonalities, Weber clearly states that on the essential level 
“there is a profound opposition” between the opposing maxims 
that correspond to these two kinds of “ethically oriented activity” 
and that this opposition cannot be “conclusively argued out” (un-
austragbar gegensätzlichen Maximen). This means that there is no 
ethical or scientific authority and no rational or empirical scientific 
procedure that could provide and ultimate and undisputable solu-
tion for the clash of these two approaches to ethics. Every leading 
politician has to rely on her own judgment and needs “to choose” 
between one of the two approaches and their corresponding “ulti-
mate Weltanschauungen.”78  
There is a high likelihood that Weber’s considerations on the re-
lations of politics and ethics are inspired by his study of Machiavel-
li’s writings. In the context of these short considerations, he men-
tions Machiavelli and his works several times.79 In these mentions, 
Weber also makes it plain that he does not share the widespread 
criticism of the Florentine. Most important, in his considerations 
Weber focuses on the main problems of Machiavelli’s political 
ethics.80 These concern the tension between traditional morality 
and politics and the relation between bad means and good ends. 
A central question for a realist conception of politics, which Weber 
and Machiavelli share, is the relation of means and ends and in 
particular the question of the extent to which a good end is able 
to sanction immoral means. Both are convinced that it is possible 
topics of the “ethos of politics as a ‘cause’ [Sache]” and the “ethical home 
of politics,” he clearly states: “At this point, admittedly, ultimate Weltan-
schauungen collide, and one has eventually to choose between 
them”;Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 355.
78 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 355. In all likelihood, the 
lack of an ethical authority or scientific procedure to “conclusively argue 
out” the conflict between the opposed approaches to ethics explains We-
ber’s statement that has been taken to be “confusing”: “But whether one 
ought to act on the basis of an ethics of conviction or one of responsibility, 
and when one should do the one or the other, these are not things about 
which one can give instructions to anybody”; Weber, “The Profession and 
Vocation of Politics,” 367; Bruun, Science, Values and Politics, 271.
79 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 360, 363, 366. In the bi-
ography of her husband, Marianne Weber reports that when he was only 
12 years old Weber told his mother that he borrowed Machiavelli’s Prince 
and intended to read the Anti-Machiavel next; Marianna Weber, Max We-
ber. Ein Lebensbild (München / Zürich: Pieper, 1989), 48. 
80 Cf. M. Knoll, “Machiavelli’s Consequentialist Ethics of Responsibility,” 
History of Political Thought 40 (2019/4).
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to achieve knowledge about the means necessary to achieve given 
political ends and to rationally calculate their usage.81 Concerning 
the tension between morality and politics and the relation between 
bad means and good ends Weber explains,
No ethics in the world can get round the fact that the achievement of 
‘good’ ends is in many cases tied to the necessity of employing morally 
suspect or at least morally dangerous means, and that one must reckon 
with the possibility or even likelihood of evil side-effects. Nor can any 
ethics in the world determine when and to what extent the ethically 
good end ‘sanctifies’ the ethically dangerous means and side-effects.82
Weber indicates his preference for an ethics of responsibility by 
merely asking “when and to what extent” a good end can justify an 
immoral means instead of questioning whether this is possible at 
all. For him, the former question is among the “ethical paradoxes” 
that no ethics can decide.83 Therefore, in such a difficult situation 
every leading politician has to make her individual decision and is 
morally responsible for its consequences. Weber’s preference for 
an ethics of responsibility can be seen also from the fact that he in-
cludes “sense for responsibility” (Verantwortungsgefühl) as one of 
the three main qualities that a politician needs to have.84 The other 
two qualities are “passion” (Leidenschaft) and “judgment” (Augen-
maß). Weber even regards the “feeling of responsibility” to be the 
most important quality as it includes the other two. The passion 
of a politician should be a “passionate commitment to a ‘cause’ 
[Sache],” for which she feels responsible.85
81 According to Machiavelli, there is a certain “necessity” (necessità) in his-
tory that allows us to compare political events and to learn from them. This 
necessity is mainly rooted in human nature, which has been the same in 
antiquity as it is today. For Weber, the social sciences are able to deter-
mine which means are necessary to realize ends or values through political 
action. In a political community, it is in particular the bureaucracy that 
possess the “technical” knowledge about the means necessary to reach 
desired results. Despite their conviction of such possible achievements of 
scientific reason, both share the insight that we are living in a contingent 
world and that there are severe limits to predicting the effects and conse-
quences of political actions or plans.
82 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 360.
83 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 365.
84 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 352. 
85 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 352-53. Weber rejects a 
“mere ‘power-politician’” who strives for power for its own sake. Power is 
the indispensible means of politics but it should always serve a “cause” 2 
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According to Weber, Christian ethics or an ethics of conviction is 
not appropriate for the sphere of politics. The main reason for this 
is that for such kind of ethics it is prohibited to employ violence, 
the specific means of politics,
It seems that the ethics of conviction is bound to founder hopelessly on 
this problem of how the end is to sanctify the means. Indeed the only 
position it can logically take is to reject any action which employs mor-
ally dangerous means. Indeed the only position it can logically take is 
to reject any action which employs morally dangerous means.86 
This is the main argument with which Weber rejects the ethics of 
conviction for the sphere of politics. He also criticizes it by saying 
that an ethics that asks to turn the other cheek is “an ethic of in-
dignity, except for a saint.”87 For Weber, the only appropriate eth-
ics for the sphere of politics is an ethics of responsibility according 
to which a leading politician is morally responsible for the conse-
quences of her decisions. All “Realpolitik” has its “point of depar-
ture” in the postulate that “the responsibility for the predictable 
consequences of the action is to be taken into consideration.”88 
However, for a politician with real decision-making power it is im-
possible to foresee all consequences, effects, and side-effects of a 
decision. An ethics of responsibility is not able to spare her from 
making difficult and troubling decisions and cannot “issue an ethi-
cal decree determining which end shall sanctify which means.”89 
Therefore, every politician has to decide for herself and shoulder 
the moral responsibility of her decisions. In politics, “diabolic 
powers” are at work and a leading politician will in all likelihood 
be entangled in guilt and will endanger the “salvation of his soul.”90 
In his Habilitationsschrift, Lothar Waas claims that Weber con-
tradicts himself by, on the one hand, claiming that the clash be-
tween the two types of ethics cannot be “argued out” (ausgetragen) 
(Sache). However, “The nature of the cause the politician seeks to serve by 
striving for and using power is a question of faith”; Weber, “The Profession 
and Vocation of Politics,” 354-55. A leading politician needs to decide 
about her cause and her goals.
86 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 361.
87 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 358.
88 Weber, “The Meaning of ‘Ethical Neutrality’,” 16.
89 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 362.
90 Weber, “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 366.
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and, on the other, endorsing an ethics of responsibility.91 However, 
Weber’s point is not that one cannot argue about this conflict, but 
that it cannot be conclusively argued out by scientific or ethical 
reason. This means that there cannot be a scientific ultimate ra-
tional grounding for either approach to ethics. No ethicist or social 
scientist is able to scientifically decide for the politician what to 
do and how to act. Nevertheless, as Weber’s discourse on politics 
clearly demonstrates, it is possible to argue both that an ethics of 
responsibility is appropriate for the sphere of politics and that an 
ethics of conviction is not. The crucial point here is that Weber 
does not claim that his arguments for an ethics of responsibility 
provides an absolute or ultimate rational grounding for it. He for-
mulates his arguments not as a social scientist or as an ethicist, 
but as a political publicist.92 Therefore, Waas’s claim that Weber 
contradicts himself cannot be upheld.
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MAX WEBER’İN SİYASET, AKIL, DEĞERLERİN ÇATIŞMASI VE ETİK 
ÜZERİNE DÜŞÜNCELERİ
ÖZ
Bu makale, Max Weber’in değer çatışması teorisinin realist 
politika anlayışıyla bağlantısını ve politikayla etik arasında-
ki ilişkiyi nasıl tasavvur ettiğini incelemektedir. Bu incele-
me, aynı zamanda Weber’in sosyal bilimler ve etik alanın-
da aklın sınırı hakkındaki görüşlerini de kapsamaktadır. 
Weber’in bilim felsefesinin merkezi, sosyal bilimlerin “etik 
tarafsızlığı” (Wertfreiheit) hakkındaki metodolojik düşünce-
leridir. Bu makalenin ilk tezi, Weber’in uzlaşmaz değerler ve 
idealler çatışması teorisinin Nietzsche’ye dayandığını ileri 
sürmektedir. Makalenin ikinci tezine göre, Weber’in bilim 
felsefesinin genel iddiası değerlerin ve normatif teorilerin 
nihai rasyonel, felsefi veya bilimsel bir temelinin bulunma 
ihtimalinin olmadığıdır. Weber’in politik alandaki sorumlu-
luk etiğine destek vermesi, bilim adamının “etik tarafsızlığı” 
(Wertfreiheit) varsayımına aykırı olduğu eleştirisine yol aç-
maktadır. Makalenin üçüncü tezi, Weber’in politik sorum-
luluk etiği konusundaki savlarının metodolojik postülasıyla 
uyumlu olduğunu iddia etmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Max Weber, Siyaset, Akıl, Ahlak, Değer-
ler çatışması, Siyasi realizm, Ahlaki Tarafsızlık.
